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Abstract 
Of the estimated 1.3 million Urdu-speaking Muslims who migrated 
to Pakistan immediately following the country’s creation in 1947 more than 
one million migrated to the region of East Bengal in present day 
Bangladesh.2 Sixty years later, a little over 300,000 are thought to remain, 
160,000 of whom are still living in the ‘temporary’ camps set up by the 
International Committee for the Red Cross following the War of Liberation in 
1971.  
The camps themselves represent a liminal space, ‘between and 
betwixt’ recognised points of cultural classification.3 Originally constructed 
as transitory shelters en route to an imagined home (‘Pakistan’), forty years 
on they represent something quite different.  
Through the experience of space, settlement and segregation, this 
paper questions the significance of a sense of ‘home’ in understandings of 
‘diasporic identity’ and reveals that instead of a transition between homes, 
these spaces can be understood as liminal homelands in themselves. The 
camp has become both a collective identity, and the spatial and symbolic site 
for a re-constructed belonging. Does the resolution of liminality therefore, as 
assumed by anthropological theory,4 remain elusive? 
 
Key Words: Displacement, diaspora, citizenship, rights, integration, space, 
settlement, camps, South Asia.  
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1.  Introduction 
Of the estimated 1.3 million Urdu-speaking Muslims who migrated 
to Pakistan immediately following the country’s creation in 1947 more than 
one million migrated to the region of East Bengal in present day 
Bangladesh.5 As Urdu-speakers, sharing certain linguistic and cultural 
similarities with the (West Pakistani) Punjabi elite, these migrants came to 
regarded as conduits of the Pakistani colonialists and following the War of 
Liberation in 1971 were branded enemy collaborators, disenfranchised and 
socially ostracised. Only 300,000 are thought to remain, around 160,000 of 
whom have been living in ‘temporary’ camps set up by the International 
Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1972. The remaining 140,000 live 
outside the camps, ‘integrated’, to varying degrees, within majority Bengali 
society. With the advantage of a non-camp address and increasing cultural 
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and linguistic integration with the Bengali majority, some of these individuals 
appear also to be accessing rights of citizenship previously denied them. As a 
result, social and economic divisions are thought to be growing between the 
camp and non-camp based communities.6 
Certain strands of ‘diaspora discourse’ fail to interrogate such 
divisions, constructing instead homogenous groupings “firmly rooted in the 
conceptual ‘homeland.’”7 My research challenges these debates and explores 
some of the ‘intra-diasporic’ issues of difference and diversity that have been 
much neglected.8 By examining the internal dynamics of one diasporic 
population we can see that what it means today to belong to such a grouping 
may be many different things to many different people. As a minority 
population that is negotiating distinct settlement structures, they provide a 
unique opportunity to explore the tension between interlocking identity bases 
and senses of self. Identity, solidarity and ‘community’ are clearly formed, as 
Brah would contend, on the basis of competing ‘multi-axial’, intersectional 
identifications.9  
The population I have chosen is a paradigmatic case of the historical 
aftermath of colonialism and the displacements of population that resulted. I 
have drawn on an ethnographic methodology and have been influenced 
conceptually by approaches from anthropology and linguistic politics to 
analyse the long-term consequences of this experience. The significance of 
class, status and social position in dividing ‘diaspora’ is foregrounded 
through the experience of settlement and segregation. My research suggests 
that through such experience a position of liminality is expressed; a position 
as conducive of solidarity as the ‘imagined communities’ of language and 
common ‘culture.’10 Instead of a transition between homes, the camps can be 
understood as liminal homelands in themselves. Although they occupy a 
threshold between recognised points of cultural classification, they have 
become both a collective identity, and the spatial and symbolic site for a re-
constructed belonging. Whether they therefore represent positions of 
perpetual liminality, a possibility little considered within traditional 
anthropological theory, is a question this paper confronts.11 I argue that a 
more nuanced understanding of ‘diaspora groups’ within their specific spatial 
setting is crucial to furthering the debate.  
 
2.  The Politics of Bangladesh and Pakistan and the Formation of 
‘Diaspora’ 
The ‘Urdu-speaking community’ in Bangladesh could be described 
as a ‘lingusitic diaspora’12. The descendants of over one million Urdu-
speaking Muslims who migrated from India to East Bengal (then East 
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Pakistan) following the country’s creation in 1947, they are distinguished 
from the Bengali-speaking majority largely through language.13 
On arrival, sharing a recent and often traumatic migratory 
experience, the community were united by a strong sense of collective 
membership and vivid recollections of home; India’s post-Partition ‘Urdu-
speakers’ were a coherent cultural and linguistic community. Many had fled 
violence in North Indian states such as Bihar (as well as Utter Pradesh, Orissa 
and others), and the label ‘Bihari’ has been used in reference to the 
descendents of these migrants in the region ever since. Controversially they 
also shared certain linguistic and cultural similarities with the ruling (West 
Pakistani) Punjabi elite and consequently gained increasing influence in the 
new state.14 However linguistic and cultural differences between the migrants 
and the local Bengali population prevented peaceful coexistence.15 They 
“came to be known as conduits of the West Pakistani ‘colonialists’, who were 
not to be trusted.”16 
The ‘Bengali language movement’ of 1952, marked increasing 
Bengali animosity to exploitation from West Pakistan and a growing 
determination to protect what they saw as attempts to undermine the region’s 
cultural identity.17 As suspicion mounted, the words of Major Ziaur Rahman, 
the future president of Bangladesh, sealed the community’s fate: “Those who 
speak Urdu are also our enemies because they support the Pakistan army. We 
will crush them.”18 Cultural, linguistic and political tensions culminated in 
the Liberation War of 1971. Following the country’s Liberation, the entire 
Urdu-speaking community were branded enemy collaborators and socially 
ostracised. Thousands were arrested or executed, while others, having been 
dispossessed by the state and fearful for their lives, were forced to flee.19 A 
sense of ‘Diasporic unity’ was now constructed in different terms. ‘The 
community’ had been displaced for a second time, but now ‘within’ the land 
that had become their ‘home’. They were once again ‘othered’ but not as a 
result of their own actions (emigration) as much as the events that took place 
around them.20  
Many of those who had lost land, jobs and family members found 
themselves in temporary camps set up by the International Committee for the 
Red Cross. In 1972 735,180 Urdu-speakers were recorded as housed in 66 
temporary camps around the country.21 It is estimated that around 160,000 
remain today in the camp-like ‘settlements’ established immediately after the 
war. Disenfranchised, isolated and lacking leadership, for thirty-six years 
after the War they were labelled ‘Stranded Pakistanis’ and left in limbo.  
As the drop in numbers above also suggests, since 1971 a proportion 
of the population have begun to establish themselves outside the camps. 
Around 140,000 ‘Urdu-speakers’ are now thought to live outside, integrated, 
to varying degrees, within majority Bengali society. With the advantage of a 
non-camp address and increasing cultural and linguistic integration with the 
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Bengali majority, some of these individuals have been accessing rights of 
citizenship for some time. As a result, social and economic divisions are 
growing between the camp and non-camp based communities.22  
In May 2008 the High Court of Bangladesh passed a landmark 
judgment.  The entire community were finally granted citizenship and 
prospects for acceptance appeared to be improving. Thirty eight years since 
the War of Liberation however, the complexion of the ‘community’ has 
fundamentally changed. Today they are a ‘diaspora’ divided along cultural, 
political, linguistic, generational, socio-economic and spatial lines.  
 
3. Literature Review - ‘Diaspora’, Belonging and Home 
The modern usage of the term ‘diaspora’ stems from a reference to 
“the threat of dispersion facing the Hebrews.”23 however it is now used in 
reference to broad and diverse ‘constructions of collective membership’. 
Proposing itself “as a master trope of migration”24, the semantic expansion of 
the term has incited criticism for many years.25 As Brubaker asserts, “If 
everyone is diasporic, then no one is distinctively so”,26 and as early as the 
1980’s, a move towards definitional rigour was proposed.27 Numerous 
categorisations, ‘typologies’ and ‘frameworks’ that attempted to distinguish 
existing diasporas from “other, seemingly similar but essentially different 
phenomenon”28 followed. The search itself assumes a great deal (not least 
that ‘real’ ‘diasporas’ exist, alongside ‘fakes’) and has resulted in the creation 
of entities that emphasize coherence and objectivist measurement.29 
“Diasporas are cast as unitary actors. They are seen as possessing countable, 
quantifiable memberships.”30 
It was Sheffer in 1986 who first introduced the idea of a referential 
homeland as a fundamental component. Since this time, maintenance of a 
connection with a place of origin has remained pertinent to understandings of 
the term; “the essential element here is a spreading from an original 
homeland, and diasporas are defined descriptively with reference to that 
origin.”31 This could be real or imagined but the required orientation towards 
it was an authoritative source of value, identity and loyalty.32 While this 
“yearning for another place”33 may be complicated by attachment to ‘host’ 
societies,34 the assumption that it is mutually perceived by all members of the 
‘diaspora’ has been insufficiently interrogated.  
Although different strands of literature have emerged,35 this body of 
work, which places emphasis on an ancestral past, remains located in 
organicist metaphors of cultural reproduction, naturalized images of blood 
and nation, assuming congruence of people, state and territory.36 As such it 
has received criticism for championing a diasporic identity associated with 
conservatism and the reinscription of a ‘shared culture’ or past. Clifford has 
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criticised what he called the ‘centred’ model of Safran and others, orientated 
to a single source by a teleology of ‘return.’37 By deploying a notion of 
ethnicity which privileges the point of origin in constructing identity and 
solidarity ‘diaspora’ reinforces the essentialism it proposed to contest,38 
simultaneously re-ascribing the nation/territory it proposed to subvert. As 
Anthias has argued, whether “the phenomenology of displacement…(would) 
necessarily always construct some notion of homeland or ‘homing’ to use 
Brah’s term…would be a matter of empirical investigation at the level of the 
local and particular39. Such work has yet to be fully undertaken and the jury 
is still out.”40 By treating each ‘disapora group’ as a unity inter and intra-
ethnic processes were ignored41. Kalra, Kaur and Hutnyk have also observed 
tremendous variety in the nature of connections with a homeland.42 Not only 
may migrations have occurred in different historical periods and for different 
reasons but different countries of destination may have provided different 
social conditions, opportunities and exclusions.  
It has been argued that, as a result, the concept of ‘diaspora’ has 
failed to articulate differences with regard to the roles played by class and 
gender.43 Diasporic encounters are necessarily composite, and the naturalised 
gender-neutral diaspora has provoked widespread criticism in recent years for 
failing to accept that they are embarked upon through multiple modalities of 
gender, ‘race’, class, religion, language and generation.44 “As such, all 
diasporas are differentiated, heterogeneous, contested spaces, even as they 
are implicated in the construction of a common ‘we.’”45 Here Brah’s concept 
of ‘multi-axial locationality’ is crucial to understanding diaspora relationality, 
the significance of positionality across articulating fields of power. Moreover, 
diasporic experiences are often complicated by competing sets of social 
relations - those of ethnic community or ‘home’ as well as the country of 
settlement. This double-bind is thought to be particularly problematic for 
members of the younger generation and children of ‘diaspora’ are often 
portrayed as caught between ‘two cultures.’46 While this assumption can be 
criticised for theorizing culture in an overly rigid and deterministic manner, it 
is another example of the way in which ‘diaspora’ experiences and 
representations are articulated through multiple sites of belonging and 
overlapping relations of power. 
 
4. Theoretical/Conceptual Framework – Liminal Space 
The question of home is intrinsically linked with the way in which 
processes of inclusion or exclusion operate and are subjectively experienced 
under given circumstances, and those forcibly ‘uprooted’ from their home, 
for example, are likely to have a very specific relationship to it47. It could 
indeed be argued that, ‘uprootedness’ or ‘refugeeness’ “is itself an aberration 
of categories, a zone of pollution”48 precisely because of the absence of 
‘home’. ‘Refugees’ and ‘the displaced’, seen to haemorrhage national 
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boundaries, are produced and made meaningful by the categorical order 
(‘nation-state’) that excludes them.49 As a result they occupy dangerous, 
“vacant and fuzzy spaces”50 challenging “time-honoured distinctions between 
nationals and foreigners”.51 The anthropology of rites of passage and the 
liminal phase is illuminating here.52 As Turner explains, “transitional beings 
are particularly polluting, since they are neither one thing nor another, but 
may be both…and are at the very least ‘betwixt and between’ all the 
recognised fixed points in the space-time of cultural classification.”53 
Werbner argues that a sense of fear or threat is strongly associated 
with liminal or in-between spaces at the edge of categories, or areas where 
categories cross.54 An example of this is the anxiety performatively expressed 
towards ‘the hybrid’ under conditions of colonial management.55 Set against 
an order premised on “culture in neat and tidy national formations”56 
refugees, the displaced, and ‘uprooted’ are a problem, a challenge to legal 
codes and juridical order.57 The need is therefore to set aside by setting apart, 
to differentiate, externalise and exclude. Turner’s conceptualisation of 
‘structural invisibility’, highlights possible reasons for the invisibility of 
refugees, displaced and stateless peoples in the literature on nationalism,58 as 
well as in national discourse or collective imagination: 
 
“The subject of the structural passage is, in the liminal 
period, structurally, if not physically, ‘invisible’. As 
members of society, most of us see only what we expect to 
see, and what we expect to see is what we are conditioned to 
see when we have learned the definitions and classifications 
of our culture…The structural ‘invisibility’ of liminal 
personae has a twofold character. They are at once no longer 
classified and not yet classified.”59  
 
Just like refugeeness, ‘diaspora space’ occupies a liminal, interstitial 
position in Malkki’s ‘national (‘natural’) order of things.’60 Having crossed a 
border, apparently stripped of the specificity of culture, place and history, the 
diasporic individual and the refugee are reduced to “naked unaccommodated 
man.”61 They are shown in themselves as mere matter, whose form is 
impressed upon them by society, human in the most basic, elementary 
sense.62 In discerning a link with the concentration camps of Nazi Germany, 
the contribution of Arendt retains particular resonance here.63 Arendt argued 
that the refugee loses more than culture and identity; the refugee, the 
displaced or de-nationalised, also loses rights. The figure that should embody 
the ‘rights of man’ par excellence highlights instead the concepts crisis. “The 
conception of human rights based upon the assumed existence of a human 
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being as such, broke down…when those who professed to believe in it were 
for the first time confronted with people (refugees) who had indeed lost all 
other qualities…except that they were still human.”64  
Georgio Agamben resumed the debate, arguing that the refugee 
represented “nothing less than a limit concept that radically calls into 
question the fundamental categories of the nation-state.”65 In further 
analysing ‘the camp’ he expanded the idea of ‘states of exception’ in which 
the juridical order is suspended; the “ambiguous, uncertain borderline fringe 
at the intersection of the legal and the political.”66 In doing so he raises a 
number of questions regarding interstitial social locations, and the 
relationship between (wo)man and citizen.67 “Situated in a limit zone 
between life and death, inside and outside, in which (he/she) is no longer 
anything but bare life.”68  
Although the ‘death of the nation’ has long been prophesised, 
nation-ness remains “the most universally legitimate value in the political life 
of our time.”69 The concept of culture is deeply territorialized, and a bias to 
‘where you’re from’ not ‘where you’re at’70 has displaced attention from the 
material relations between the state and racialised groups, as well as 
intersecting positionalities such as class and gender.71 It leaves no space for 
internal power conflicts within the group, and assumes fixed, immutable, 
ahistorical boundaries. As Brubaker notes, “diaspora can be seen as an 
alternative to the essentialization of belonging; but it can also represent a 
non-territorial form of essentialized belonging.”72 This form of ‘diaspora’, 
defined in relation to some sacred homeland to which they must at all cost 
return, is “the old, the imperialising, the hegemonising, form of ‘ethnicity.’”73 
We are reminded of the particular clarity provided by the liminal 
position. “One of the most illuminating ways of getting at the categorical 
quality of the national order of things is to examine what happens when this 
order is challenged or subverted.”74 Exploring questions of identity from the 
experience of displacement opens up new theoretical spaces for enquiry, 
inviting us to radically rethink nationness and statelessness, and bounded 
conceptualisations of culture, society and community. Enabling us to 
question the “the notion of identity as a historical essence…or as a fixed and 
identifiable position in a universalizing taxonomic order.”75 Exploring the 
role of space and settlement in the formation of Diasporic identity we see that 
instead of a transition between homes, the camps themselves have come to 
represent re-imagined liminal homelands76. They are generative of collective 
identity, which gives meaning to marginality, becoming the spatial and 
symbolic site for re-constructed belonging. 
 
5. Methodology 
In order to examine these notions of belonging, and the role of space 
and settlement more generally, research was built around a comparison of the 
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camp-based and non camp-based communities. Non camp-based ‘Urdu-
speakers’ are scattered all over the country, and although residence is far 
from uniform, there are no mono-ethnic enclaves outside the camps so they 
are all located in mixed communities. This said however, they are most likely 
to be found in areas with a high concentration of camps (areas such as 
Mohammadpur or Mirpur in Dhaka for example) often living in rented 
accommodation on the fringes of those settlements. As they are small in 
number, even on the fringes of a camp, they are physically very well 
integrated with Bengalis. Some have however retained greater ties with the 
‘Urdu-speaking’ community, and live near the camps because they have 
relatives there and come and go daily. Others are significantly more 
integrated, in cultural, linguist, social and economic terms, with Bengalis and 
have few or no ‘Urdu-speaking’ friends.  
Research was conducted in two regions of Bangladesh: Dhaka, and 
Saidpur in the Northern Rajshahi District. Although, as mentioned, the 
population is fairly widely scattered and well established communities can be 
found in four of the five national divisions (or districts), an estimated 133,126 
of 151,368 are settled in the divisions of Rajshahi and Dhaka combined77. 
Twelve months intensive qualitative fieldwork was carried out between 2006 
and 2009, through a combination of semi-structured interviews (63), narrative 
‘case study’ interviews (10) and interviews with Urdu-speaking and Bengali 
civil society (15), as well as ethnographic methods such as participant 
observation.  ‘Civil society’ has been used here to refer to (Urdu-speaking 
and Bengali) legal specialists, academics, writers, critics, and NGO officials 
as well as local councillors, and spokespeople from International 
Organisations. Civil society has therefore been used to refer to individuals 
who occupy relative positions of power (whether within Bengali or ‘Urdu-
speaking’ circles) and unsurprising therefore only two of the fifteen 
interviewees were female. Of the further 73 interviewees however, 52% were 
female and 48% male. In addition, 57% were camp-based and 43% non-camp 
based, and they were broken down into ages of 18-24 (15), 25-49 (37) and 
50+ (21). Having assumed ‘the middle age’ sub-section would be the most 
difficult to get hold of, greater difficulty was experienced interviewing 
individuals aged 18-24 who were often occupied with full time work and 
study. Older interviewees, although freer, were the most likely to be busy 
with religious commitments or reluctant to be interviewed due to 
suspicion/fear or a disinclination to repeat old, distressing tales. 
Interviews were conducted in Urdu or Bengali depending on the 
preference of interviewees, and were recorded and then transcribed to 
facilitate analysis. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Frederick 
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Bonnart Braunthal Trust as well as RMMRU, Al Falah and the Shamshul 
Huque Foundation.   
 
6. Analysis/Evaluation 
A. We, the ‘Urdu-speaking Community’ - ‘Insiders’, ‘Outsiders’ and the 
social ‘elite.’ 
As has been mentioned, the ‘Urdu-speaking community’ is a highly 
heterogeneous one, with divisions and distinctions deepening along social 
and spatial lines. Not only are some still living in the slum-like ‘camp’ 
settlements (‘insiders’) while another group has more recently moved outside 
(‘outsiders’), but a third group also exists. These people are neither camp-
dwelling nor previously camp-dwelling and they can be found occupying an 
entirely distinct social position (‘elite’). They were able to retain their houses 
after the war and have therefore merged virtually unseen into the local 
Bengali majority. 
When asked what defines ‘the community’ in relation to the Bengali 
majority ‘Urdu-speakers’ themselves disagree. Some invoke a shared 
experience of migration, a shared history: “We migrated from India; that is 
what makes us different.”78 Others a linguistic heritage: “I think it’s about 
our language…There is only one fact, language.”79 For some it is inherited 
culture, ‘ethno-racial’, phenotypical characteristics, or a combination of all 
these things: “The main things are language, culture and height.”80 In part 
these differences of opinion reflect generational developments within the 
community. The younger generation rarely refer to their country of origin, 
India, or their migration from that place. India quite clearly has less 
significance for individuals who have been born and brought up in 
Bangladesh and have never known anything else. Equally physical and 
cultural characteristics (such as food tastes, styles of dress, religious 
observation) are more often noted by the younger generation than those over 
50, which may be due to greater levels of daily interaction with Bengalis, or 
simply because among the over 50’s these issues are simply assumed and no 
longer considered noteworthy. The one defining feature that remains central 
to all however is language, something I will consider further in the following 
section. 
Beyond generation, a difference of opinion also reflects layers of 
disunion along spatial lines. Political and public discourse has located the 
troubles of the past less with the community itself than at the doorstep of the 
camps. And while those who retained their houses, retained their civil status, 
camp-dwellers lost all rights of citizenship previously held within the state. 
They have not been registered on voter lists (until the recent 2009 elections 
that is), and have been denied access to education, healthcare and much 
formal employment since 197281. Unsurprisingly fundamental inequality of 
civil status has dramatically altered the composition of ‘the community’. An 
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unbridgeable divide in terms of access to education and opportunities has 
been laid at its foundations, as one ‘community’ has slowly turned into two. 
Dominant public discourse is blind to such nuances. According to 
this widely accepted narrative, ‘a community’ of so-called ‘Mohajirs’82, 
‘Stranded Pakistanis’83, ‘Biharis’, ‘Urdu-speakers’ or ‘Maowras’84 were 
disenfranchised on the grounds of their support for a national enemy 
(Pakistan)85, and as the result of an ethno/linguistic identity that had become 
problematic. Many of the better integrated ‘Urdu-speakers’ however have 
always had a passport, remained registered as voters throughout, and some 
have continued to work in responsible Government positions. A few of the 
young elite know almost nothing about the camps, and many feel no 
connection with the camp population. These families have the same ‘ethno-
linguistic’ heritage but have always occupied a position of respect within 
society. The discrimination suffered by those that ended up in the camps has 
almost completely passed them by.  
 
“Our family never lived in the camps, our grandfather 
owned this house”. (How were you able to keep it during the 
War?) We had two houses before the War, one house was 
lost but my grandfather was a contractor in the Pakistani 
army and he had lots of Bengali friends so we were able to 
save this house.”86 
 
“...we had some Bengali friends who were in a good 
position in the Government so they saved us…When the 
Pakistani army came I helped some Bengalis, that’s why 
they helped me during the War. Only four people in this 
street retained their houses, it used to be 100% Urdu-
speaking...”87  
 
“I had a lot of Bengali friends in 1971 and I walked around 
with them with no problem because we saved each other...I 
was able to rent a house after the war because the landlord 
was a (Bengali) friend of mine. I was a local community 
figure at the time, so everyone knew me, this made it 
easier.”88 
 
It is clear from the above quotes that those who were able to retain their 
houses after the War were well connected with Bengalis, the cause and effect 
of which was their generally above average socio-economic status. Favoured 
by the ruling Punjabi elite well-educated ‘Urdu-speaking’ migrants had been 
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given positions of responsibility in post Partition Pakistan and during this 
period (1947-1971) many had developed close relationships with influential 
Bengalis while working at senior levels in Government departments. As such 
they had a better safety net to fall back on when livelihoods were threatened. 
Even if one house was lost, another may have been saved, or as many report, 
a well-connected relative stepped in with help, and they were able to avoid 
the desperation of the camps. The degree to which those that remained 
outside were affected by the aftermath of War unsurprisingly varied widely89 
but on the whole they blended well into Bengali society. While most 
experienced some discrimination in the early 70’s, their widespread 
acceptance since (in relation to the camp-population in particular) is telling of 
the authority of class positionalities. 
 
B. The Cultural Status of Language 
These class positionalities are reflected in widening disparities of 
language use. Not only do those living outside the camps speak better 
Bengali than those inside (again in some sense both cause and effect), but 
many also have a very different relationship to the one thing that is meant to 
connect the whole community – Urdu. While those that have always lived 
outside the camps speak, to varying degrees of ‘purity’, a fairly standardized 
Urdu90, “The language of the camp is a language of its own.”91 The language 
of the camp would in fact be more accurately be described as a language 
variety, than a language, (in the same way as it would be more accurate to 
call Standard Urdu a language variety than a language), since it is one variety 
of Urdu among many92. Some informants described the camp form as an 
accent or a style but I believe it better described as a dialect since differences 
occur at the level of lexis, grammar and pronounciation. It blends other 
languages with Urdu, consisting of a mixture of Bodgpuri (an Urdu-based 
regional dialect of Bihar), Bengali, and Hindi.93  
The degree to which these language variations replicate pre-War 
class and language variance is not entirely straightforward. The centrality of 
‘Bodgpuri’ within the camp dialect suggests some degree of congruence with 
pre-War social dialectical forms. Although some Bodgpuri speakers would 
also be proficient in Standard Urdu, as a rural dialect it is generally 
associated with a lower socio-economic status. Standard Urdu like any other 
standardized form is however associated with those of a higher socio-
economic status in part because it reflects access to certain social experiences 
in particular certain forms of education and schooling94. Over time however 
both language varieties have developed. The camp form has blended with 
other regional dialects from India (due to the sudden cohabitation of migrants 
from different parts) as well as vocabulary borrowed from Bengali and Hindi. 
It is referred to by those in the camps as ‘Urdu’, although this is contested by 
those living outside. The younger generation of elite Urdu-speakers who have 
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always lived outside refer particularly condescendingly to this strange 
“bastardised” form:  
 
“They don’t speak Urdu in the camps anyway. Or not proper 
Urdu. They speak some kind of South Indian dialect I 
think”...“No, something from Bihar…a kind of ‘Bodgepuri 
thing?”95 
 
 “The camp dwellers speak the Bihari local dialect.” (Is that 
the language you speak?) “I cannot speak that (laughs)!”96 
 
(So how often do you speak Urdu?) “Only to my mother and 
my aunty but I speak it fluently. It’s not like they speak in 
the camps though (he laughs). If you heard me speak you 
would notice the difference. They speak a kind of mixture of 
other things.” (He looks at his younger cousin and says 
something I don’t understand and they laugh. Why are you 
laughing?) “Because it’s funny. Have you heard the way 
they speak? It’s like the difference between Cockney and 
English. It’s funny.”97 
 
The previous quote makes a useful comparison. Both Cockney and Standard 
English are well recognised language varieties of English with some 
similarities to Standard Urdu and its nonstandard variants in relation to socio-
economic association. Nonstandard dialects of English, as of other languages, 
“are generally simultaneously both geographical and social dialects which 
combine to form both geographical and social dialect continua”.98 However 
Standard English and Standard Urdu are purely social dialects, even if we can 
tell that their origins may have originally been in the southeast of England99 
or the area around Delhi respectively. The camp dialect differs from Cockney 
and most nonstandard language variants however in the specifics of its 
geographical connections. Unlike most nonstandard dialects it has no 
regional home in the sense that it can be found all over the country, in urban 
areas, from North to South, East to West. However at the same time it has a 
very definite geographic locus, being only found where camps are situated. 
The dialect takes much the same form in camps nationwide, differing only 
very slightly from region to region.  Like Cockney however, widely 
associated with the working class, the dialect’s social base is strong. It is a 
dialect only spoken and understood by those concentrated at the very bottom 
of the social scale. It is a language that has developed out of marginalisation 
from the nation, among those with little or no access to education 
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(particularly education in Urdu), and has therefore diverged powerfully from 
standardized forms. 
The cultural status of language is clearly potent in this context. It 
connects individuals instantly to a particular end of the socio-economic 
spectrum, and is the source of much teasing and abuse. Some in the camps 
themselves, or among those recently ‘integrated’ outside, speak equally 
disparagingly of their own language: 
 
“No, no we are not practicing Urdu. It’s a kind of 
hodgepodge of languages.”100 
 
“In the camps we are speaking the Urdu which is valueless. 
It is Urdu ‘dust’, ‘rubbish’ (‘dhula’)… they (those outside) 
can’t understand us...and they say my Urdu is valueless.”101 
 
Language itself forms a barrier between and within an apparently 
‘linguistic community’.  
Despite its troubled past, outside the camps among literary circles, 
Urdu in its ‘pure’ (standard) form, associated with North India and Pakistan, 
is still revered. Even though it remains unrecognised by the Bangladeshi state 
and is treated with some suspicion by the majority Bengali population, here 
significant capital is still generated through a respected Urdu cultural lineage. 
Intellectual gatherings and Urdu poetry recitals (Mushairas) are common and 
linguistic heritage is valued.102 Urdu, in this context, has to some degree 
therefore remained ‘high culture’, despite its bloody past.  
Unsurprisingly generation draws further boundaries however and 
among younger ‘Urdu-speakers’ such reverence is less common. Outside the 
camps Urdu is only spoken in the home as, after the war, Urdu-speakers were 
forced to hide their ancestry for fear of Bengali reprisals. As a result most 
young Urdu-speakers who grew up in Bangladesh no longer read or write the 
language and many continue to conceal their linguistic heritage: 
 
“Lots of literary people’s children don’t read Urdu. They 
(the parents) have some fear (that they will be discriminated 
against) and so they started sending them to learn 
Bengali.”103 
 
 “When I speak with my wife I do it in Urdu, when I speak 
with my daughter I do it in Bangla...And Hindi….This is the 
fact, after our aged generation pass away Urdu will be lost. 
The young generation are interested to learn Bangla and 
English for their livelihoods.”104 
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Another language has been embraced by this generation as the above 
quote illustrates. While Pakistan and the Urdu language have complicated 
associations in Bangladesh, India’s national language, ‘Hindi’, is free of 
many of the battle scars: 
 
(What language do you speak?) “…Aaaaah Hindi – my 
parents are from Bihar, India. My father knows Bangla but 
he feels more comfortable with us in Hindi” (Is this not 
Urdu?) “Most Hindi channels on TV are in Urdu. All 
Bollywood songs are 90% Urdu, but they call it Hindi.”105 
 
“In India basically in Bollywood they are using the Urdu 
language but the language is commonly known as Hindi. 
Lots of Hindus in India speak Urdu but they call it Hindi 
because they’re almost ashamed to call it Urdu due to the 
Muslim association…The young generation in Bangladesh 
are very much interested to watch the Hindi channels…”106 
 
“I feel embarrassed to speak Urdu because the Pakistanis 
were the losers and they speak Urdu too...If I say that I am 
Indian, I can speak Hindi well. It’s something of a relief.”107 
(Her father adds) “Bengali people hate Urdu but love Hindi. 
And yet they can’t tell the difference!”108 
 
For young people in Bangladesh India is aspirational; a global power 
representative of fashion, media and modernity in all its forms. The growing 
influence of Hindi among a younger generation of middle class ‘Urdu-
speakers’ (and Bengalis alike) is sentiment to a shifting geopolitical 
landscape, in which Pakistan’s old adversary has increasing international 
sway. 
 
C. Class and Social Stratification 
As we have seen, those who were able to retain their houses and 
avoid moving in to the camps were ‘the community’s’ social elite. Spatial 
segregation therefore also represents social stratification. The rich have 
become richer, educating their children in universities overseas, or migrating 
again themselves, and the camp-dwellers, without access to education and 
discriminated against in terms of employment have become poorer. As it was 
on the whole those of a lower social status that were forced to move into the 
camps this internal social structure does to some degree replicate pre 1971 
positions. However any previous social stratification within the Urdu-
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speaking community has been magnified by the existence of the camps, and 
the attending de-nationalisation of some members of the community and not 
others. Those who have in recent years made enough money to move out of 
the camps into rented accommodation outside have felt this social shift first 
hand: 
 
 “Camp-dwellers are treating us differently (since we moved 
outside), they think Alim is rich now. Bengalis (also) think 
that ‘if Alim managed his rented house he has wealth’, so it 
will increase your value. ‘He has dignity now because he 
lives outside. His landlord knows he must have some money 
that is why he is ok with it’…It’s a big problem to get a flat 
in Dhaka…If we say we are from the camp they do not 
allow us to rent their flats…It’s about their society, they are 
not able to mix with Bengali educated society. They cannot 
maintain their status with the locals…some think ‘if they 
have lived in the camps they won’t know about hygiene etc, 
they might not look after the house’…”109 
 
“Sometimes our camp neighbours treat us as an elite or rich. 
They felt shy to talk to us, it created a barrier. When we 
went to them they often say that now you people are rich so 
we are not on your level…I found out my sisters hadn’t been 
back to the camp for two or three months…they are 
socializing more with Bengalis as a result.”110 
 
The ‘barrier’ Mr Alam describes has widened to such an extent that 
many of those that have always lived outside feel as detached from the camp 
community as they do from poor Bengali society: 
 
“I do not have friends in the camp, because we are wealthy 
and have ‘better society’ (acchi mahol). I know some of 
them who are very poor...some of them cannot even speak 
Bangla...”111 
 
 “In my family we have some cross marriages with Bengalis. 
It’s good to merge with the locals. Better than Bihari people 
who are uneducated and illiterate.”112 
 
 (Have you ever been to the camps?) “of course not, why 
would I? (laughs) I don’t have any time for those people. 
They’re called Maowra you know.” (pause) “I’m sorry... I’m 
not a humanitarian. I look after myself, that’s how we do 
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things here.” (Have you ever called any of them Maowra?) 
“I’m ashamed to admit it, but yeh, I have. One time I had 
some of them fixing my car and I knew it was the brake, but 
they kept saying no it was the exhaust, and I knew, I know a 
lot about these things, and I was getting annoyed so I 
shouted the same thing in Urdu. And then they listened, and 
decided it was the brake! They gave me a cheap deal and the 
job was done. So I said to them ‘right, so you *#?*# 
Maowra you’ll listen to another Maowra but no-one else.’” 
(So you’d call yourself a Maowra too?) “No, I’m not a 
Maowra, I mean no-one would call me that.” (Why?) 
“Because I have too much power.”113 
 
 Social discrimination among and between ‘Urdu-speakers’ would 
obviously have occurred before the camps existed, but the complexion of this 
discrimination has clearly changed. Camp-dwellers are not simply social 
inferiors but a national problem, dirty, un-educated, burdens on society. The 
memories they evoke in the national imagination, and the condition of 
stateless such imagination afforded is threatening to the position of the non-
camp social elite in a way that their mere social inferiority could never have 
been. For some disassociation with the camp population has been a strategy 
of self protection. 
 
D. The Power of Place: labels, ethnicity and identity 
As we have seen popular discourse and the corresponding silence of 
the state re-enforced the camp population’s ‘de-nationalisation’, turning 
spatial divisions into national ones. Those Urdu-speakers who have lived for 
many years as citizens may be culturally distinct from the Bengali majority in 
some way, but they are no longer liminal. Liminality is located in the camps, 
and individuals express their own identities in these spatial terms. Inside the 
camp they are an un-categorizable ‘ethno-linguistic’ minority, outside they 
are Bangladeshi: 
 
“Before I moved outside the camp I had many names, 
Bihiari, Stranded Pakistani, Maowra114. Now to other people 
I’m just Bangladeshi.”115 
 
“The people who are living in the camp are treating me 
differently now I have a good place to live. When I was in 
the camp, the Bengalis used to call us Bihari. However here 
no-one can say that...I think the label Bangladeshi is more 
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comfortable for me (now)…When I was in the camp I was a 
Stranded Pakistani.”116 
 
(What label would you give yourself?) “Bangladeshi. People 
who live outside the camps are very much Bangladeshi.”117 
 
The language of labelling in contexts such as this is clearly 
incredibly powerful. The label ‘stranded Pakistani’ helped to cement the 
camps externality in the country’s national psyche (and throughout the 
country’s legal system) for thirty-six years118. In a hostile host environment, 
when people move outside the camps the line between ‘integration’ and 
‘assimilation’ is inevitably blurred. Outside the camps a ‘Bihari’ or ‘Urdu’ 
heritage retains identificational resonance only among those powerful enough 
to associate with the term: 
 
“I do not have any Urdu-speaking friends. I know some of 
them that I think are Urdu-speakers but they hide it. The 
number of people hiding their language is high. It’s very 
important to hide the Urdu language to get a job. Sometimes 
I might work with someone for 2 years and not know they 
are Urdu-speaking because society doesn’t let us...People 
are afraid of being the minority.”119 
 
“I like to introduce myself as Bihari as I am a person who is 
not dependable on others. I often say’s to my Bengali 
friends that they are the farmers and we are the prince (she 
laughs)...I don’t want to take it seriously. But I am 
exceptional. Trust me.”120 
 
The significance of these spatial divisions is highlighted by those individuals 
whom we might describe as ethnically Bengali121 but who understand 
themselves as ‘Bihari’ due to the context of their social community. Shahana 
Begum’s story highlights the identificational resonance of place/settlement, 
and the way in which it intersects with language and local community: 
 
“When I came here before my marriage I was totally 
Bengali. I couldn’t speak a word of Urdu and since coming 
here I have completely switched! (She laughs) Now it’s 
difficult to understand Bangla rather than Urdu. Now I’m 
more fluent in Urdu!” (Laughs again). “When I first came to 
the camp I was teased for not speaking Urdu. They said 
things in Urdu but I didn’t understand. The one word I 
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understood was ‘Bangali’. They were calling me ‘Bangali, 
Bangali’122…”  
“At that time I didn’t feel like an Urdu-speaker I felt like a 
Bengali but as I came here and was teased so much, I 
struggled so much to learn Urdu. And after two or three 
years hard work I got Urdu and the teasing stopped. And 
now I feel like a Bihari.”123 
 
Intermarriage between Bengalis and ‘Biharis’ is no longer 
uncommon. Most Urdu-speakers have a Bengali marriage somewhere in their 
family. Some evidence even suggests that as many as twenty five percent of 
camp residents are ethnically Bengali.124 Ethnic, cultural and linguistic 
boundaries are clearly highly opaque, and informed by the realities of a local 
environment: 
 
“We have to mix with the Bengali culture whether our 
culture will be lost or not, that is not the matter…I cannot 
even write my name in Urdu. When a person leaves the 
camp he leaves his culture there…”125 
 
E. The Social Location of Home. 
In many cases with more to unite around ‘inter-ethnically’ than ‘co-
ethnically’ a once important ‘diasporic home/origin’ now occupies an illusory 
position. The label ‘Bihari’ is probably that most commonly used among all 
social strata126, the very word descriptive of a majority diasporic homeland. 
Despite its own misleading reference (to the state of Bihar alone as opposed 
to North Indian states more generally) and pejorative usage, camp dwellers in 
particular identify strongly with the term. The geographic location or ‘home’ 
it originally denoted however has all but disappeared: “They think of 
themselves as ‘Bihari’ but only four or five of the camp population would 
actually describe themselves as ‘Indian.’”127 This correlates with the first 
phase of research I conducted in 2006 in which under ten percent of the camp 
population referred to themselves as Indian. 
 
“I would call myself Bihari. ‘Hay Bihari Pakistan, hay 
Bihari Pakistan’ (a traditional lament for Pakistan’s refusal 
to accept them)...I wouldn’t call myself Indian because 
people are always saying we are Pakistani, why should I 
alone call myself Indian? If I say I am Indian will India take 
me? No.”128 
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Historical associations in part explain this. Much of the older 
generation in the camps have complicated feelings towards India due to 
memories of the devastating communal violence they experienced. Many still 
greatly distrust the Hindu population, and lost family and friends in the 
violence before they fled. Immediately after the War of 1971, and in part as a 
result of fear and exclusion, they chose to identify with a ‘home’ (Pakistan) 
that further excluded them, disenfranchised them even. Ever since, they have 
been lost in the limbo of India/Pakistan/Bangladesh: “Now I am nowhere, 
have no identity, (I am) not Bihari, not Bangladeshi, (I am) nothing.”129 “We 
don't have any nationality: we're not Indian, not Bangladeshi, not Pakistani, 
so we don’t have an identity…”130 A sense of loss is naturally felt most 
strongly among older members of the camp community, those born before 
1971. The vast majority of the younger generation in the camps feel a strong 
sense of Bangladeshi identity. They have spent their lives trying to be 
accepted in Bangladesh, and know nothing else. The ‘silencing of trauma’ is 
well-researched and after years of communal violence, a brutal war and a 
double displacement many youngsters don’t even know where their parents 
came from let alone the true tragedy of their story.131 
Notably however, outside the camp, association with India (and as 
we have seen, the Hindi language) has become possible again. Among this 
‘integrated’ section of the population pride in the original ‘diasporic home’ 
may be coming back. ‘Bihar’, as a state has no cultural kudos132 and Pakistan 
is tainted by War, but here India as a country is modern, trendy and 
sophisticated: 
 
“When I say my mum’s from Bihar people frown upon it 
still....When people say to me ‘if your mum is Bihari is she 
Pakistani?’ I say ‘Do you know where Bihar is?’ Have you 
looked on a map? It’s in India!’ It shows that the perception 
of an association between Biharis and Pakistan is still very 
much there. Bengalis don’t have a problem accepting Hindi 
but they do have a problem accepting Urdu.”133 
 
“Hindi is very common in Bangladesh. It is true also; we 
migrated from India so we are Indian rather than Pakistani. I 
sometimes tell my friends I am Indian and speak Hindi, I 
create an identity for myself.”134 
 
Paradoxically the notion of India somehow distances these 
individuals from their ‘Bihari-ness’, juxtaposing them against Pakistan and 
the War, and instead they are associated with Bollywood movies, global 
fashion and modernity.  The older generation outside the camp have retained 
a strong collective memory too, articulated particularly through the Urdu 
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literary culture mentioned. In some sense class, status, and the ‘luxury’ of 
memory they bring, have given many of the more successful, integrated 
Urdu-speakers the chance to explore their geographic and cultural roots.  
The “ethnic myth of common origin, historical experience 
and…geographic place”135 that may still hold for more ‘integrated’ members 
of the community, has however been erased for much of the younger 
generation in the camps. This generation of camp-dwellers describe 
themselves as ‘Bihari’ but their home, as well as their ‘homeland’, is the 
camps of Bangladesh. Identities have been constituted in spatial terms and in 
the camps years of disenfranchisement and the silencing of trauma have cut 
them off from their geographical roots:  
 
 “What unites the (camp) community isn’t language, India, 
history…it’s the camp. A camp identity is stronger than 
anything else. It is this identity that is labelled ‘Bihari’, 
that’s why it’s become a term of abuse – and within the 
camp it is also how 90% of people define themselves.”136 
 
“We are residents of the camp, we are camp people.”137 
 
In many ways diaspora discourse has privileged ethno-racial links of 
origin and ‘home’ over inter-ethnic relations of space, place and locality. In 
an increasingly interconnected world the ability of transnational communities 
to share more than physical ones has been well recognised but the “limits of 
those transtate communities”138 has not. Physical proximity is formative of 
cultural communities too, and can generate powerful bonds of mutual 
engagement. To neglect these not only undermines restrictive power relations 
intra-diasporic groups may conceal, but also the potential for inter-ethnic 
alliances. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In an influential analysis of camp and non-camp ‘Hutu refugees’ in 
Tanzania, Malkki observed a similar but distinct, situation.139 She too 
encountered a camp population that had formed a powerful connection to 
their liminal situation, locating “their identities within their very 
displacement, exacting meaning and power from the interstitial social 
location they inhabited.”140 She also studied a town population that 
underwent some form of ‘assimilation’, or in her words ‘creolization’, where 
“the very ability to ‘lose’ ones identity and move through categories was for 
many a form of social freedom and even security.”141 The difference is 
however significant.  Without the intra-diasporic issues of power I have 
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highlighted, her reading is more celebratory; ‘Hutu refugees’ in Tanzania are 
seen creatively exploiting an order of liminality. While in Tanzania 
“categorical loyalties were regarded with caution, sometimes disdain”142 in 
favour of ‘cosmopolitan’ subversions of identification, in Bangladesh they 
are everywhere embraced. Here, categories and labels of bounded fixity give 
meaning to a liminality that has ‘structurally silenced’ them for so many 
years. When surfaces are unpeeled emotional attachments and the boundaries 
of belonging, fuse, fissure and fragment, but this belies some sense of 
necessitated self-classification.  
The responses I witnessed were also conditioned by the realities of 
money, power and status. The powerful elite ‘Urdu-speakers’, the poets and 
intellectuals, were able to assert an Urdu heritage without shame. With a 
recognised civil status, a Bengali education, wealth and acceptance, they had 
become less of a threat, less of a problem. In stark contrast to the camp’s 
status in Tanzania, as a “locus of categorical purity”143, in Bangladesh the 
camp and those who live there still occupy that dangerous ‘fuzzy’, polluting 
space of order resisted and reversed. Among the non-camp elite therefore 
‘integration’ has to some extent protected individuals from the necessity to 
erase their history and their ‘home’ altogether. Without this ‘integration’, 
those of a lower social status face much greater pressures from ‘assimilation’. 
Their ‘Urdu-ness’ is not accepted because it comes for the camp, because it 
comes from poverty and threatens the purity of the national (‘natural’) order. 
In order to get by, ‘Bengalization’ becomes a priority. 
Previous analyses of ‘the liminal phase’ in ‘rites of passage’ have 
assumed a third phase, in which “the ritual subject…is in a relatively stable 
state once more, and by virtue of this has rights and obligations vis-à-vis 
others of a clearly defined and ‘structural’ type.”144 They have therefore 
assumed a resolution. Men/women are released from structure, only to return 
to it. “What is certain is that no society can function adequately without this 
dialectic.”145 The ‘Urdu-speaking’ camps in Bangladesh, like many other 
across the globe, represent a case of displacement, turned ‘long-term 
displacement’, and transition turned permanent condition. However, the 
research also reveals the pressure society or ‘structure’ exerts on this order of 
liminality. The demands of assimilation are patently apparent. Some evade 
such pressure, retaining elements of competing cultural worlds, but only by 
the virtue of their location within the structures of society that frames them. 
Mother-tongues (to which memories, relationships and socialisations are 
often tied) are abandoned in the name of belonging, as the border-guards of 
culture, religion, language etc define the boundary of the nation. As van 
Gennep, Turner, Douglas and others originally proposed, through a return to 
structure, a resolution is assumed.146  
In many ways the ‘Urdu-speaking community in Bangladesh’ does 
not match up to much that is associated with the concept of ‘diaspora’.  
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Thirty eight years of segregation has left a community divided on linguistic, 
religious, cultural, political and socio-economic lines. The existence of a 
historical ‘motherland’, as a constant point of reference, has simply not 
survived. Within one city they are a group constructed as much in terms of 
singularity as solidarity. 147  
This empirical investigation however reveals that while internal 
connections are varied and multiple, these ‘spaces of exception’ not only 
constitute a place of origin for the thousands of people born and brought up 
there, but they also represent sites of real emotional and metaphysical 
connection. For some therefore they have come to represent the ‘homeland’ 
or ‘referent-origin’148 that was believed to have been lost. 
Postmodern approaches have made substantial contributions to 
widening ‘diaspora’ discourse, emphasizing the importance of individual 
trajectories and historical perspective,149 ‘routes as well as roots’,150 fluidity 
and dynamism. However the attempt to define ‘diaspora’ “not by essence or 
purity but…hybridity”151 continued to draw more comparison between 
‘diasporas’ than within. The enduring emphasis on a collective point of origin 
persists in situating the nation-state at its heart.152 Difference is indeed 
celebrated, but too often premised on absolutist notions of ‘collectivity’ (the 
‘illusion of community’ to use Dufoix’s term) that is insufficiently 
addressed.153 Anthias notes that within the academic debate “the lack of 
attention to issues of gender, class and generation…is one important 
shortcoming.”154 Research here clearly highlights the danger of neglecting 
such intra-diasporic issues of difference and diversity, homogenising a highly 
heterogeneous population. Gender, class and generation are areas of key 
social signification that position Urdu-speakers in highly contextualised 
ways. Other areas of intra-group division are significant too however and 
even further neglected from the academic debate, such as settlement and 
segregation which my research finds to be a powerful variable of opposition.  
What binds a large proportion of ‘the community’ here therefore is 
not an attributed origin but conditions of space, place and locality. Solidarity 
is manifested at the local level. While in part reflective of a deeply-rooted 
intra-ethnic socio-economic hierarchy that is very difficult to bridge, it is at 
the same time enabling of trans-ethnic alliances that should not be foreclosed. 
Within diasporic groups understanding of ‘home’ are fluid, multiple and 
continually contested in response to individual and dynamic contextual 
conditions. The importance of more nuanced understandings of ‘collective 
origin’ to diasporic populations is critical not only in maintaining space for 
inter-ethnic dialogue but also in understanding how identities and inequalities 
are conditioned and expressed.  
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The ability of the group to survive over time, to retain a ‘diasporic 
consciousness’ or a sense of collectivity, has been regarded by some as 
another ‘condition’ of definition.155 This paper shows that the degree to 
which a consciousness of diasporic roots, collective memory, history, culture, 
or an ‘ethnic myth’ is retained will depend considerably on relations of power 
and acceptance within the host community. Here the elite ‘Urdu-speakers’, 
those ‘better-integrated’ into Bengali society, who have avoided the 
stigmatisation of the camps (and the disruptive liminality they represent) are 
better positioned to claim an Urdu ancestry without fear. Paradoxically 
therefore ‘integration’ to some extent protects individuals from what appears 
to be the slow but inevitable ‘assimilation’ faced by those of a lower social 
status. In the last thirty eight years they have gradually been forced to forget 
their history, their ‘historic home’ and I believe, over time, as structure 
intercedes, will merge seamlessly into the majority. 
 
8. Policy Implications 
Long-term displaced populations occupy an increasingly significant 
position in the context of national and international geopolitics. They are 
likely to increase in line with global instability, growing regional inequality 
and international migration. This makes it particularly important to expand 
our understanding of the particular forms of discrimination to which such 
groups are subject.  
In May 2008 the entire ‘Urdu-speaking community’ were finally 
granted citizenship. Issues of citizenship are still highly contentious but as the 
High Court and the Ministry of Law continue to consider cases, interest has 
grown. Optimism has been high since the verdict in 2008 but if the rights 
they have access to are conditioned by, in this case, the discriminatory 
experience of a stigmatising Urdu ancestry what might citizenship mean? As 
Goldberg has warned, a commitment to formal equality of rights often 
neglects “the substantive conditions rendering materialization or 
manifestation of those rights possible.”156 As long as the camps are ‘othered’ 
in the public imagination as they continue to be today, associated with 
Pakistan and memories of war, those that inhabit them will be unable to 
belong as effective and equal citizens of Bangladesh. Certain quarters have 
advocated positive discrimination to compensate for some of these 
difficulties157, particularly in relation to quotas for Government employment, 
but any such move is unlikely to materialise in the near future.  
The policy implications of the research are therefore of value not 
only to the community and local civil society but in evaluating the extent to 
which ‘integration’ or access to rights impact upon experiences of 
discrimination elsewhere. They cast a severe warning against the 
homogenising tendencies of Governments and International Organisations in 
relation to displaced, refugee or minority populations and remind us that 
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access to rights and respect are dependent on numerous competing 
intersectional identifications. 
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Bihar’s tragic history of famine, poverty and violence has done little to 
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146 van Gennep, 1960, Turner, 1967, 1969, Douglas, 1966. 
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148 Dufoix, 2008. 
149 R Ballard, Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain, Hurst and 
Company, London 1994. 
150 P Gilroy, 1993a. 
151Hall, 1990 p. 235 Breaking “the dogmatic focus on discrete national 
dynamics” (Gilroy, 1993a p.6). 
152 Anthias, 1998. 
153 Dufiox, 2008. 
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154 Anthias, 1998 p.577. 
155 “The will to transmit a heritage and the ability of the group to survive over 
time” (G Chaliand and J-P Rageau, Atlas des diasporas, O’Jacob, Paris, 
1991, p.xiv-xvii, see also Kearney 1995 p.553). 
156 D T Goldberg, The Racial State, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2002 
p.251. 
157 As is slowly being adopted in the case of Bangladesh’s indigenous 
populations such as the Chakma and Marma of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. 
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